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As decolonisation movements gathered strength following World War II, independence and
development were seen to go hand-in-hand and thanks partly to President Truman’s 20
January 1949 Inaugural Address linking the fight against communism with development
assistance, aid and expertise from the West have been a driving force in development
programs. Moreover, development economics and development practices have operated in
tandem - structuralist and Dependency theory ideas outlined in the excerpt by Paul Sweezy in
this book were influential in the early postwar period on the practices of developing
countries. Donors, though, were more influenced in this period by the Keynesian/neoclassical
synthesis emphasising infrastructure and area development programs.

In the 1980s, neoclassical economics in its neoliberal form made a resurgence and, in the
developing country context, became a set of policies known as the Washington Consensus,
because they were hammered out in Washington between the US Treasury, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Washington Consensus, however, did not
provide a way forward for most developing countries, indeed the 1980s was labelled the ‘lost
decade’ for Africa. These poor outcomes, along with practical and theoretical critiques from a
range of perspectives led donor country development agencies to change their goals. They
now claimed that participatory development, pro-poor policies and promotion of good
governance underpinned their support efforts. I argue that the Washington Consensus
commitment to conservative monetary and fiscal policy continues to frame most donors’
overall programs and that while they may aim to get the poor above $1 per day, that is the
extent of their vision – there is no broader goal of equality or social justice.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the development path of many newly independent states was inspired
by structuralist ideas and thus tended to centre around three main options for achieving
industrialisation and growth: autarky; accessing foreign capital to build the industrial sector;
and using the state to accumulate necessary resources for development. Most developing
countries opted for blend of foreign capital and state-led development – this was a key basis
of the strategy of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) (Rapley, 2002: 21). ISI was seen
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as a way of generating rapid and self-sustaining growth that would promote economic
diversification away from reliance on primary commodities while, at the same time, attracting
foreign capital. It promoted increased production of locally manufactured goods for domestic
consumption to nurture and strengthen the domestic market. ISI uses tariffs and quotas to
make the local market more benign for local producers; in other words, it protects domestic
producers of manufactured goods so that they can compete against foreign producers,
particularly those in already industrialised countries that have better access to technologies,
existing economies of scale, skilled workforces, etc. A range of additional policies have been
used to support ISI including overvaluing the domestic currencies to make importing capital
goods cheap; directing foreign investment to key economic sectors; and concessional access
to available foreign currency or credit for domestic firms diversifying their production.

Western aid donors, for the most, did not discourage ISI strategies and certainly supported
state planning for development but their focus tended to be on funding infrastructure and later
on rural development schemes. The focus in infrastructure was roads, railways, ports, dams,
electricity generation and the like – often on a grand scale and often with little consideration
of social or ecological consequences. By the mid-1960s, water supply and sanitation schemes
were supported in both rural and urban areas and rural development schemes gained
prominence, with funding focusing on irrigation, technical support for farmers and access to
credit to improve the application of technology to farming. Support for the health and
education sectors has always received a lot of attention and publicity in the development
arena but, in fact, they are generally not to be the focus of donor aid. There have been cases
of successful donor supported programs – South Korea and Taiwan being prominent
examples – but already by the late 1960s it was clear too that much done in the name of
development did little to help the lives of the poor.

By the end of the 1970s, various scholars and practitioners came to the conclusion that ISI
and other state-led development strategies were not working. There were problems with the
operation of ISI, however, attributing the difficulties faced by most developing countries
simply to ISI was misleading. Developing countries faced a range of challenges from low
levels of infrastructure and education through to highly concentrated land holdings and
economies still largely structured around raw material production for their former colonial
powers. The more hostile global environment from the early 1970s was another problem, this
period saw the first postwar recession in the West and a subsequent turn towards trade
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protectionism. The first OPEC oil shock in 1973 increased balance of payments difficulties in
oil importing developing countries and the recycling of so-called petrodollars as loans to
developing countries fuelled the already growing debt crisis. The second oil shock in 1979 hit
the Third World hard, commodity prices fell dramatically. The US decision to focus on
combating inflation, inspired by neoliberalism, saw large increases in international interest
rates from 1979. This increased the flow of money from the developing world to the
developed world and facilitated the outbreak of the Debt Crisis in 1982. Regardless of the
causes, the overall faith in the developmentalist paradigm of state planning began to fade and
neoclassical and neoliberal influences increased.

There were exceptions to the trend of poor development and growth outcomes in the
developing world – the Asian Tigers achieved ongoing high levels of growth. The Tigers –
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong - generally started out utilising ISI
strategies but often selectively and often with conditions on industrialists benefiting from the
policy. From the early 1970s, they started to switch towards a policy of encouraging
manufacturers to export – a strategy that became known as Export Oriented Industrialisation
(EOI). It is worth noting, though that they still selectively pursued some ISI elements, for
example protecting new ‘infant industries.’ Further, the EOI strategy involved detailed
industrial policy often pursing areas outside the country’s area of ‘natural’ comparative
advantage. This is important because many of the neoliberal critics of state-led development
strategy tended to ignore this component of the Tiger’s development.

The origins of the neoliberal diagnosis of developing countries’ dates back to the 1940s but
the framework did not become mainstream amongst development economists until the 1970s.
It’s analysis of the problems in developing countries comprised three interrelated ideas, that:
the public sector was over-extended; there had been too much emphasis on physical capital
formation often at the expense of human capital formation; and the Third World had
developed too many market-distorting economic controls (Toye 1993, 70). This analysis
dominated orthodox development economics for two decades. Further, neoliberal analysis
became widely accepted amongst policy-makers because its rise coincided with the economic
crises of the 1970s for which it purportedly had an explanation and a solution. Further, wellfunded think-tanks, World Bank researchers and many in the press set out to disseminate
neoliberal views. However, it was the election of the Reagan Administration in the US that
broadly legitimised neoliberal economics and facilitated its global implementation through its
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own aid programs and through its influence on international institutions like the World Bank
and IMF. Not all developing countries needed persuasion to adopt neoliberal development
strategies; in a number of countries domestic elites held and promoted neoliberalism too.

Within a few years of appearing the Washington Consensus achieved widespread acceptance,
and by the early 1980s, a common set of policy prescriptions for developing countries could
be identified. John Williamson gave it the name the Washington Consensus in 1990. It
involved two phases or ‘reform’, first, policies to achieve short-term macroeconomic
stabilization that were carried out quickly via ‘big bang’ reforms. The focus here was cutting
the budgets of developing nations, devaluing national currencies and ending price controls
and subsidies. The second phase involved a whole range of long-term, structural and
prescriptive microeconomic policy ‘reforms’ aimed at making markets and private property
central institutions in developing countries whilst minimizing the role of the state. Achieving
the first phase of reforms was generally seen the IMF’s responsibility, while the second phase
was the realm of the IMF, World Bank and bilateral donors jointly. In the wake of the 1982
Debt Crisis, conditionality on loans and aid was the main way in which adherence to
neoliberal policy prescriptions was achieved.

Neoliberal policy prescriptions for development have been no more successful than state-led
ones. Indeed, in following these prescriptions many sub-Saharan countries ended the 1980s
and 1990s worse off, demonstrating in particular that the social costs of neoliberalism were
very high. As with state-led development programs, the failure resulted in a questioning of
both policy prescriptions and theoretical frameworks. However, we have not yet, witnessed a
fundamental overturning of the development paradigm, instead the current consensus – the
post-Washington Consensus – maintains the Washington Consensus commitment to
conservative monetary and fiscal policy and this, above all, frames and constrains
development programs. This continuity is despite, or perhaps because of, the growing
influence of New Institutional Economics (NIE) in development economics. NIE expands
views of what constitutes market failures to include information failures and transaction costs
and this leads to a picture of markets with extensive imperfections as opposed to the
neoliberal view of perfectly working markets. It remains firmly within the neoclassical
tradition.
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Joseph Stiglitz is one of the most prominent scholars in the NIE tradition working on
development issues. One of his key contributions is on the extent of information asymmetry
in markets, in other words that markets are subject to extensive imperfections with the
implication that government action can be efficient in many more circumstances than allowed
for by neoliberal and even much neoclassical analysis. If this is true for developed countries,
it is more the case in developing ones, where Stiglitz turned his attention after becoming
Chief Economist of the World Bank in 1997. This was precipitous timing, just months before
the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. Stiglitz became a well-known critic of the IMF and
their one-size-fits-all approach to development. Stiglitz (2002, 16, 65-67) has also critiqued
the neoliberal push for ‘big bang’ capital market liberalization. He argues that there is little
evidence that it promotes economic growth and that without attention to the order and timing
of reforms, it can cause more harm than good. Overall the questioning of Washington
Consensus policies has gone furthest amongst economists, if not amongst policy makers, in
this area of capital market liberalization (Broad 2004, 138).

In terms of development programs, the most striking change of the post-Washington
consensus period has been large-scale donor support for programs of ‘good governance.’ This
is a very broad and generally ill-defined term that, at the end of the day, often sees donors
funding (mostly Western) consultants to help recipient governments in the areas of
budgeting, financial systems and auditing. While these are undoubtedly important areas,
donor’s technocratic approaches have all too often involved transposing Western models,
systems and laws to developing countries. The outcome is a lot of money spent for systems
that have little relevance to the historical, cultural, organisational and political economic
context of the recipient country.

Recent aid efforts have seen some increased support for social support systems, not however,
as much as donor’s public pronouncements would have us believe. Health and education
remain small components of the World Bank and many other donors’ programs. So-called
participatory community development schemes and microfinance have been the big winners
in aid funding. The operation of these programs is worth exploring a little because it gives
insights into the nature of the post-Washington Consensus support for poverty reduction.

Participatory community development schemes are an evolution of the rural area
development schemes of the 1970s. The participatory focus was new borrowed from non5

governmental organisations that had emphasised participation as a counter to top-down donor
development models ignoring community knowledge and power structures. These had often
left communities worse off and exacerbated inequalities. However, in the hands of the major
bilateral and multilateral donors, participation became a narrow and instrumental concept and
tool. For example, in World Bank funded rural electrification programs in Vietnam the
community participation that was highlighted as part of the project was actually just formal
household agreement to pay for their electricity connection! In other projects though
participatory development is more invasive, it is the language donors (and some
governments) use to justify structure and organising ‘civil society’ to manage their own
development projects. Communities are organised in parallel to existing local governance to
structures to form organisation to manage the construction of local infrastructure and social
support services. They are trained in ‘proper’ community consultation methods and in
(neoliberal) managerial techniques and kept busy ensuring there is no ‘misallocation’ of
resources rather than being involved in socially and politically transformative reflection or
action.

Microcredit is equally a neoliberal strategy, which makes individuals responsible for their
own development, though it did not fully start out this way. It was developed simultaneously
by Ela Bhatt in India in 1974 and Mohammad Yunus in Bangladesh in 1976 in response to
economic and institutional conditions limiting the productive potential of skilled artisans.
They were particularly concerned lack of access to saving and loans mechanisms, which
results in the poor using informal channels for lending, such as money lenders, who generally
charge exorbitant interest rates. In contrast, microcredit offers the poor small loans at more
manageable interest rates.

The most common model of provision involves the formation of small groups (5-6 people),
who initially make regular savings deposits into the scheme for a period of three to six
months. This forms the group collateral – here, the savings and the group’s commitment.
After establishing group collateral, one or two members of the group can take out loans, the
purpose of which must be creating or expanding a microenterprise. If loans are successfully
repaid over a period, other group members become eligible for loans. This system has
produced very high repayment rates for most schemes. In the past decade, microcredit has
expanded to include a broader range of financial services (savings, insurance) for poor
people, hence it’s now generally called microfinance.
6

Microfinance had a transformative agenda yet it has not always lived up to the claims made
for it. Over time it has become increasingly commercialised and, through that process, less
supportive of pro-poor change. Operating a small loans program is costly so microfinance
programs charge high interest rates – the global average is 37 per cent per annum but in
Mexico it is 70 per cent and there are reports of institutions charging 125 per cent
(MacFarquhar 2010). These high interest rates have attracted increasing numbers of private
institutions - non-government organisations are only responsible for servicing about 35 per
cent of clients. Private providers do not support most of the rights-based microfinance
agenda.

Most microfinance loans are targeted at women and claimed to empower them as well as help
them out of poverty. These claims are problematic as running businesses often adds to
women’s already high workload and their changed their role in the family can strain
marriages. Husbands sometimes use or control loans yet expect their wives to make the
repayments. Group collateral has been shown to lead to pressure tactics being applied to
ensure members make repayments. Most schemes require immediate weekly repayments
meaning micro-business investments need to make immediate and high returns. Loans are
often used for immediate consumption and often new loans are taken to repay existing ones.
Microfinance does not always reach the poorest of the poor nor challenge women’s
traditional roles.

Microfinance programs are not the panacea to global poverty that has sometimes been
claimed. They do not: eliminate the need for basic social and infrastructure services; end
vulnerability to economic shocks; or create economic opportunities for the poor given the
odds are still stacked against the self-employed in the global marketplace. Microfinance
should be seen as a key policy response to crises that follow from structural adjustment
programs, it is “…a neo-liberal safety net for neoliberal political restructuring” (Weber 2004,
360).

Examining donor’s social support programs under the post-Washington Consensus finds a
limited program with minimal support for health care and education and slightly more
support for a range of self-help development schemes, which do not address the broader
political economic structures that constrain the life chances of the poor in developing
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countries. There is some support here for ending the most extreme forms of poverty,
however, that is also the extent of most donor’s ambition. This limited ambition is the
product of both mainstream development economics and donors’ political economic agendas.
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